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LEGAL SOURCES OF RESIDENTIAL 
LOCK-INS: WHY FRENCH 
HOUSEHOLDS MOVE HALF AS 
OFTEN AS U.S. HOUSEHOLDS 
Robert C. Ellickson* 
In a given year, a resident of the United States is roughly twice 
more likely to move to a different home than is a resident of France 
(or of western Europe as a whole).  Cultural differences undoubtedly 
account for some of this gap.  The central thesis of this Article, how-
ever, is that much of this disparity in residential mobility can be 
chalked up to differences between U.S. and French (and other Euro-
pean) legal policies—in particular, taxation statutes, land-use policies, 
landlord-tenant laws, and housing assistance programs.  This Article 
also offers a normative framework for analyzing the desirability of 
household relocations.  Legal policies that foster residential moves 
can enable individuals to better match themselves with a job, a dwell-
ing, a set of housemates, a tenure arrangement, a neighborhood, and 
a municipality (à la Tiebout).  A decision to move, however, may give 
rise to negative externalities, such as erosion of local social capital.  In 
theory, although rarely in practice, people thus can move too often.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rates of mobility reveal the dynamism—or, from a gloomier per-
spective, the instability—of a society.  There are three basic measures of 
demographic flux within a nation.  Sociologists tend to focus on social 
mobility, for example, the likelihood that a person of humble origin will 
be able to rise in social status.1  Economists, for their part, tend to focus 
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Wozniak, and participants in workshops at the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The 
Hague; Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona; Notre Dame Law School; Sciences-Po Law School, Par-
is; UCLA Law School; University of Paris–Panthéon-Assas; and Yale Law School.  Thanks also to 
Alyssa King and Nicholas Walter for vital research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., ROBERT ERIKSON & JOHN H. GOLDTHORPE, THE CONSTANT FLUX: A STUDY OF 
CLASS MOBILITY IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (1992). 
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on job mobility, that is, the rate of changes in positions of employment.  
And demographers are the main experts on residential mobility, namely, 
how frequently people change their permanent places of residence.  Intu-
itively, these three rates of flux should be positively correlated.   
I focus in this Article on the third of these measures: a nation’s rate 
of residential mobility.  My normative thesis is that this rate is an un-
derappreciated measure of the well-being of a populace.  Policies that 
foster freedom to move can benefit the members of a relocating house-
hold in myriad ways.  Moving to a different permanent home may enable 
a person to secure, for example, a better job, a more congenial set of 
housemates, and a dwelling with more suitable attributes.  The freedom 
of a household to exit from a jurisdiction also helps to discipline govern-
ments and enable Tiebout-style specialization among them.2  It is surpris-
ing, then, that civil libertarians seldom exalt the freedom to move.3  Per-
haps they have been all but silent because residential mobility can have a 
downside as well.  Household moves may cause, to borrow a phrase from 
Schumpeter, the “creative destruction” of informal relationships among 
neighbors––a seemingly valuable form of social capital.4 
For concreteness, the focus here is on the patterns of residential 
mobility in two nations: the United States and France.  Roughly fourteen 
percent of U.S. residents move to a new dwelling in a given year.  In 
France, and in Europe as a whole, the annual percentage of movers is 
about half that figure.5  This disparity arises partly on account of cultural 
and demographic differences.  I emphasize, however, the influence of dif-
ferences in French and U.S. legal policies.6  A variety of French laws, 
 
 2. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418–19 
(1956) (envisioning that suburbs compete for residents by offering different packages of public poli-
cies). 
 3. Some judges have made passing reference to the importance of freedom of relocation.  See, 
e.g., Boraas v. Vill. of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 817 (2d Cir. 1973), rev’d, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (“Appel-
lants are entitled, subject to lawful and reasonable local laws, to travel and settle down where they 
please.”).  
 4. JOSEPH E. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83–84 (Harper & Row 
1976) (1942).   
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 8–11.  See also Quentin David et al., Local Social Capital 
and Geographical Mobility, 68 J. URB. ECON. 191, 191 (2010) (placing annual residential mobility in 
Europe as a whole at about five percent).  Mobility is highest in the Scandinavian countries, and low-
est in Southern Europe.  Id.  For a European nation, France actually is relatively mobile.  See HOLGER 
BONIN ET AL., GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: OPTIMISING ITS ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL BENEFITS 42, 46 (IZA Research Report No. 19, 2008).  
In the early 1980s, New Zealand’s nineteen percent annual mobility rate was one of the highest 
in the world.  See infra tbl.1.  At that time, its rate was about eight times East Germany’s, which was 
2.5 percent.  W. Paul Strassmann, Housing Market Interventions and Mobility: An International Com-
parison, 28 URB. STUD. 759, 765 (1991).  In the late 1990s, the annual rate of residential mobility of 
households throughout the newly united Germany was 6.8 percent.  David et al., supra, at 191. 
 6. Prior statements of the thesis that housing policies may have a major influence on mobility 
rates include P.C.J. Everaers & W.A.V. Clark, Policy and Mobility in Dutch Housing Market Contexts: 
The Influence of National and Local Policies on Intra- and Inter-City Mobility, 75 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
ECONOMISCHE EN SOCIALE GEOGRAFIE [J. ECON. & SOC. GEOGRAPHY] 242, 242–43 (1984); Larry 
Long, Residential Mobility Differences Among Developed Countries, 14 INT’L REGIONAL SCI. REV. 
133, 141–42, 145 (1991); and Strassmann, supra note 5, at 759. 
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perhaps unintentionally, tend to deter households from relocating.    
These include taxation, landlord-tenant and housing assistance policies 
that tend to lock French households into place, and a land-use control 
system that limits the variety of available housing.7  Much of this Article 
is devoted to describing these measures and pointing out how they differ 
from those found in the United States.  In the latter part of the Article, I 
offer a normative framework that lawmakers might use when considering 
whether to encourage or discourage household relocations. 
II. RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE,  
AND ELSEWHERE 
Census officials around the world typically gauge residential mobili-
ty by identifying the proportion of a nation’s population that moves from 
one dwelling to another during a certain time period (typically either one 
or five years).  Because nations’ methodologies vary, cross-country com-
parisons are rare.  Table 1 presents data from one of the best-known 
studies: Larry Long’s estimates of annual residential mobility in various 
nations circa 1981.  The table indicates a wide spread between the ex-
tremes, with New Zealand’s annual rate more than triple Ireland’s.  The 
U.S. percentage (17.5 percent) is nearly double that of France (9.4 per-
cent), figures that support the stylized fact that Americans move twice as 
frequently as the French do.8  Observe that the Swiss move more often 
than most other Europeans, a fact to which I shall return. 
 
 7. See also W. Paul Strassmann, Residential Mobility: Contrasting Approaches in Europe and the 
United States, 16 HOUSING STUD. 7, 8 (2001) (sounding a similar theme). 
 8. On November 8, 2008, Daniel Courgeau, a longtime researcher at Institut National d’Études 
Démographiques [National Institute for Demographic Studies], Paris, and an acknowledged French 
expert on the subject, articulated this stylized fact to this author in an e-mail message.  Decades before 
he had expressed the identical proposition in print.  See Daniel Courgeau, Comparison des migrations 
en France et aux États-Unis [A Comparison of Migration in France and the United States], 37 
POPULATION 1184, 1186 (1982).  In 2009, an authoritative French study repeated the common under-
standing that U.S. households move twice more frequently.  CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, DROIT AU LOGEMENT, 
DROIT DU LOGEMENT [COUNSEL OF STATE, HOUSING RIGHTS, HOUSING LAW] 72 (2009).  The gap 
almost certainly has narrowed since 1981.  See CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, supra, at 73; Nathalie Donzeau & 
Jean-Louis Pan Ké Shon, Residential Mobility Trends in France, 1973–2006: New Estimates, 64 
POPULATION 687, 699 (Harriet Coleman trans., English ed. 2009) (both detecting some increase in 
French mobility rates); see also infra note 12 and accompanying text (reporting a decline in the U.S. 
rate).  By far the narrowest estimate of the difference in rates appears in Raven Molloy et al., Internal 
Migration in the United States, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2011, at 173, 193 fig.5 (presenting a graph, 
extrapolated in part from Eurobarometer 64.1 data, that indicates that the annual residential mobility 
rate in France is less than one percent below the U.S. rate). 
In both nations, mobility rates differ from region to region.  In the early 1980s, Pennsylvania 
had the lowest mobility rate of any state (eleven percent), with Alaska, Arizona, and a few other west-
ern states at the other extreme (over twenty-five percent).  Long, supra note 6, at 139.  On variations 
within France, see, e.g., Eva Leliévre & Catherine Bonvalet, A Compared Cohort History of Residen-
tial Mobility, Social Change and Home-Ownership in Paris and the Rest of France, 31 URB. STUD. 1647 
(1994).  This Article does not delve into the causes of these subnational differences. 
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TABLE 1: 
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF NATION’S POPULATION CHANGING 













The gross figures in Table 1 obscure significant variations among 
population subgroups.  Young adults are far more mobile than older 
adults.  As Table 2 indicates, in both France and the United States, indi-
viduals in their late twenties move at least three times more frequently 
than those in their forties.10  And in both nations, renters move over 
three times more often than owners do, partly because the transaction 
costs of terminating a rental arrangement are far lower than the costs of 
selling a dwelling.11  These two patterns help explain why residential mo-
bility in the United States has been falling.  In the 1950s and 1960s, about 
twenty percent of Americans moved each year.  Since then the popula-
tion has aged, and the percentage of homeowners has increased.  By 
2001, the annual rate of U.S. mobility had diminished, as mentioned, to 
approximately fourteen percent.12 
 
 9. Long, supra note 6, at 136. 
 10. See also DONALD J. BOGUE ET AL., IMMIGRATION, INTERNAL MIGRATION, AND LOCAL 
MOBILITY IN THE U.S. 7, 9 (2009) (charting age-specific mobility rates in the United States). 
 11. NAMKEE AHN & MAITE BLÁZQUEZ, FUNDACIÓN DE ESTUDIOS DE ECONOMÍA APLICADA, 
[FOUND. FOR APPLIED ECON. STUDY] DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO [WORKING PAPER NO.] 2007-05, 
RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY AND LABOR MARKET TRANSITIONS: RELATIVE EFFECTS OF HOUSING 
TENURE, SATISFCATION AND OTHER VARIABLES 7 tbl.1 (2007) (stating that European Community 
Household Panel data for 1995–2001 indicate a seventeen percent annual moving rate for French ten-
ants and a five percent rate for French owners).  For a fuller discussion of the moving rates of different 
subgroups of Americans, see BOGUE ET AL., supra note 10, at 6–17 (reporting that women, whites, and 
the least educated, for example, are somewhat less mobile than their counterparts); JASON 
SCHACHTER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P20-538, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: GEOGRAPHICAL 
MOBILITY 3 (2001) (indicating a moving rate, per year, of 32.5 percent for renters, and 9.1 percent for 
owners). 
 12. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY RATES, BY TYPE OF 
MOVEMENT: 1947–2009, at A3 (2010) [hereinafter U.S. MOBILITY RATES], http://www.census.gov/ 
population/socdemo/migration/tab-a-1.pdf; see also Molloy et al., supra note 8, at 179.  The drop in 
U.S. mobility is disproportionately attributable to a slackening rate of local (intracounty) moves.  
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TABLE 2: 
RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY BY AGE, PERCENT PER ANNUM, LATE 1990S13 
 





40–49   4.4% 10.0% 
50–54   3.4%  8.6% 
 
Most residential moves are local.  In the United States, the median 
distance of a move in a given year is about six miles (ten kilometers).14  
Roughly three-fifths of U.S. movers remain in the same county, one-fifth 
move to a different county in the same state, and one-fifth move to either 
a different state or country.15  One of France’s basic subnational units of 
government is the département, which on average is twice the area of a 
U.S. county.  About three-fourths of French movers in a given year relo-
cate within the same département.16  
  
 
BOGUE ET AL., supra note 10, at 3–4.  I ignore the further drop in mobility after 2007 because the lock-
in effects of the Great Recession may prove to be transitory.  
 13. For France, see AHN & BLÁZQUEZ, supra note 11, at 7 tbl.1 (drawing on European Commu-
nity Household Panel data for 1995–2001).  For the United States, see SCHACHTER, supra note 11, at 3 
(reporting data for March 1999–2000) (percentages extrapolated). 
 14. See Larry Long et al., Migration Distances: An International Comparison, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 
633, 638–39 (1988). 
 15. U.S. MOBILITY RATES, supra note 12, at A3.  
 16. Daniel Courgeau & Éva Lelièvre, Estimation of French Internal Migration in the Period 
1990–1999 and Comparison with Earlier Periods, 59 POPULATION 703, 706–07 (G.I. Rogers trans., 
English ed. 2004); see also André de Palma et al., Discrete Choice Models with Capacity Constraints: 
An Empirical Analysis of the Housing Market of the Greater Paris Region, 62 J. URB. ECON. 204, 207 
tbl.1 (2007) (reporting that, in 1998, approximately sixty-eight percent of movers to dwellings in Île-de-
France (greater Paris) had previously been living elsewhere in Île-de-France). 
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III. FACTORS OTHER THAN HOUSING LAWS THAT MAY INFLUENCE A 
NATION’S RATE OF POPULATION MOBILITY 
Although this Article focuses on the possible effects of a nation’s 
legal policies on the frequency of household moves, other variables also 
matter.  If sufficient data were available, a person skilled at regression 
analysis potentially could test the significance of the various determi-
nants.  
A. Cultural and Familial Influences 
Cultural traditions surely affect moving rates.17  Members of Catho-
lic parishes, for example, tend to be less mobile than members of Jewish 
synagogues.18  Table 1 indicates that rates of mobility generally are much 
lower in the nations of old Europe than in the overseas nations that were 
once British colonies.  In a long-settled nation such as France, many indi-
viduals and families have enduring loyalties to specific regions and com-
munities.19  By contrast, early commentators on U.S. life, such as Alexis 
de Tocqueville and Frederick Jackson Turner, noted a widespread pen-
chant for pulling up stakes.20   
Family traditions appear to affect a person’s propensity to move.  
Individuals who moved often when they were children, for example, tend 
to be relatively mobile when they reach adulthood.21  Most Americans 
are either immigrants or the descendants of immigrants who were willing 
to cross an ocean to start a new life.  Those who self-selected themselves 
to come to the United States had a relatively strong taste for making a 
 
 17. See generally GEORGE W. PIERSON, THE MOVING AMERICAN (1973) (exploring the cultural 
underpinnings of U.S. rootlessness).  Cf. Paola Giuliano, Living Arrangements in Western Europe: 
Does Cultural Origin Matter?, 5 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 927, 928–29 (2007) (presenting a cultural inter-
pretation of why young adults in Mediterranean Europe tend to live with their parents); Long, supra 
note 6, at 142–44 (pointing out the relative stability of a nation’s mobility rate).  
 18. See GERALD GAMM, URBAN EXODUS: WHY THE JEWS LEFT BOSTON AND THE CATHOLICS 
STAYED 15–16 (1999).  
 19. See Paul E. White, Internal Migration in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, in 
MIGRANTS IN MODERN FRANCE: POPULATION MOBILITY IN THE LATER NINETEENTH AND 
TWENTIETH CENTURIES 13, 13–15 (Philip E. Ogden & Paul E. White eds., 1989) (noting that rates of 
residential mobility in France have historically never been high).  France, it should be noted, has ac-
cepted significant numbers of immigrants from abroad during certain periods, such as the 1920s and 
1955–1974.  See James F. Hollifield, Immigration and Republicanism in France: The Hidden Consensus, 
in CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 143, 151 (Wayne A. Cornelius et al. eds., 
1994). 
 20. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 536 (George Lawrence trans., J.P. 
Mayer ed., Harper & Row 1969) (1848)) (“An American will build a house in which to pass his old age 
and sell it before the roof is on . . . .”); FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, The Significance of the Frontier 
in American History, in THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1, 2–3 (1920) (“American social de-
velopment has been continually beginning over again on the frontier.  This perennial rebirth, this flu-
idity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with 
the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating the American character.”). 
 21. See Scott M. Myers, Residential Mobility As a Way of Life: Evidence of Intergenerational 
Similarities, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 871, 872 (1999) (finding that children, in adulthood, tend to rep-
licate their parents’ mobility behaviors).  
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fresh start and tended to pass that taste on to their descendents through 
socialization and genetic inheritance.22  Conversely, the natives of France 
who were too risk averse to emigrate abroad tended to have descendents 
who shared their penchant for staying put.23  
These cultural differences support the stereotypes that France is a 
nation where ties to family and place are unusually strong, and the Unit-
ed States, a nation of rootless entrepreneurs ever on the lookout for a 
new main chance.  But the difference between the mobility rates of the 
two populations cannot be attributed entirely to their disparate cultural 
and familial traditions.  Various French laws bolster that nation’s root-
edness, while U.S. laws work in the opposite direction.  Culture and law 
of course are deeply intertwined.  Legislators tend to honor their nation’s 
cultural values.  Conversely, a nation’s legal policies, after their adoption, 
tend to reinforce its cultural inclinations.  Nonetheless, much evidence 
indicates that, in a given culture, legal policies by themselves can signifi-
cantly influence how frequently households move.  For example, in Swit-
zerland, a nation that shares much of the culture of old Europe, the rate 
of residential mobility is significantly higher than it is in neighboring na-
tions.24  Switzerland also has, relative to its neighbors, a relatively laissez-
faire set of landlord-tenant laws and social housing policies.25  Converse-
ly, in New York City, the U.S. city with housing policies most similar to 
those in France, households move much less often than they do in other 
large U.S. cities.  Over a ten-year period, eighty-three percent of Chica-
go’s renting households changed dwellings, compared to sixty-five per-
cent of New York’s.26  If New York is “The Frozen City,” as one com-
mentator has dubbed it,27 it is unlikely that distinctive cultural attributes 
 
 22. Theoretical explorations of cultural transmission within households include L.L. CAVALLI-
SFORZA & M.W. FELDMAN, CULTURAL TRANSMISSION AND EVOLUTION: A QUANTITATIVE 
APPROACH (1981); and Alberto Bisin & Thierry Verdier, The Economics of Cultural Transmission 
and the Dynamics of Preferences, 97 J. ECON. THEORY 298 (2001).  Migrants are generally thought to 
be less risk averse than nonmigrants.  See Axel Heitmueller, Unemployment Benefits, Risk Aversion, 
and Migration Incentives, 18 J. POPULATION ECON. 93, 99 (2005).  For evidence that attitudes toward 
risk are partly inherited, see David Cesarini et al., Genetic Variation in Preferences for Giving and Risk 
Taking, 124 Q.J. ECON. 809, 834 (2009).  
 23. The analysis in this paragraph, as well as the data displayed supra in Table 1, supports the 
notion that nations inhabited mostly by recent immigrants and their descendents can be expected to 
have exceptionally high rates of internal residential mobility.  This thesis is geographically broader but 
substantively narrower than the controversial idea of “American exceptionalism” propounded in, for 
example, SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 
(1996).  See also SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: THE VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1990) (asserting that U.S. and Canadian cultures are signifi-
cantly different).  
 24. See supra tbl.1. 
 25. See Strassmann, supra note 7, at 13.  
 26. Ingrid Gould Ellen & Brendan O’Flaherty, How New York and Los Angeles Housing Poli-
cies Are Different—and Maybe Why, in NEW YORK AND LOS ANGELES: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
(David Halle & Andrew Beveridge eds., n.d.).  In New York City, sixty-four percent of rental ar-
rangements are either subject to rent regulation or situated in a subsidized project.  Id. 
 27. Howard Husock, Op-Ed., The Frozen City, N.Y. SUN (Dec. 3, 2007), http://www.nysun.com/ 
opinion/frozen-city/67378/. 
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alone have made it that way.  Also probative is R.M. Pritchard’s study of 
household moves in Leicester, England, between 1870 and 1970.  Annual 
mobility rates in Leicester fell from an average of roughly thirteen per-
cent for the pre-1914 period, to roughly 7.5 percent for the post-1919 pe-
riod.28  Pritchard attributes the drop that began in the 1920s in significant 
part to legal changes that transformed Leicester’s housing market, such 
as the advent of rent controls, council housing, and town planning.29  He 
makes no mention of any transformation of Leicester’s culture. 
B. Labor Markets 
Table 3 demonstrates that French workers change jobs significantly 
less frequently than U.S. workers do.  Economists have produced a deep 
literature on the reasons why employment in Europe tends to be long-
term, such as legal restrictions on employers’ rights to fire.30 
 
TABLE 3: 
LENGTH OF EMPLOYEE TENURE IN CURRENT JOB31 
 
  One Year or Less Ten Years or More 
Employees France: 14% 41% 
Age 26–45  U.S.: 22% 23% 
  
Employees France:   5% 74% 
Age 46–60  U.S.: 12% 50% 
Scholars have also begun to pay attention to the complex interrela-
tionship between housing markets and job markets.32  Moving to a new 
job may prompt a move to a new housing unit.33  In the United States, 
 
 28. See R.M. PRITCHARD, HOUSING AND THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF THE CITY: RESIDENTIAL 
MOBILITY AND THE HOUSING MARKET IN AN ENGLISH CITY SINCE THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
115 (1976) (percentages extrapolated). 
 29. Id. at 183–91. 
 30. See, e.g., Samuel Bentolila & Giuseppe Bertola, Firing Costs and Labour Demand: How Bad 
Is Eurosclerosis?, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 381 (1990). 
 31. See SIMON BURGESS, REALLOCATION OF LABOUR: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
USING JOB TENURE DATA 14–15 (1999).  The figures in Table 3 are rounded averages that assume an 
equal ratio of male and female workers. 
 32. See, e.g., HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE LABOUR MARKET IN EUROPE (Casper van Ewijk & 
Michiel van Leuvensteijn eds., 2009); Laurent Gobillon, Emploi, logement et mobilité résidentielle 
[Employment, Housing and Residential Mobility], 349–50 ÉCONOMIE ET STATISTIQUE [ECON. & 
STAT.] 77 (2001).  For exploration of the Oswald hypothesis, which associates homeownership with 
inferior labor market outcomes, see, e.g., N. Edward Coulson & Lynn M. Fisher, Housing Tenure and 
Labor Market Impacts: The Search Goes On, 65 J. URB. ECON. 252 (2009); Jakob Roland Munch et al., 
Are Homeowners Really More Unemployed?, 116 ECON. J. 991 (2006). 
 33. See William A.V. Clark & Suzanne Davies Withers, Changing Jobs and Changing Houses: 
Mobility Outcomes of Employment Transitions, 39 J. REGIONAL SCI. 653, 660 (1999) (finding that a 
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about one-sixth of moves are motivated for work-related reasons of this 
sort.34  The relative stickiness of French labor markets therefore could be 
expected to dampen residential mobility.35  But there also are influences 
that run in the opposite direction.  Because French housing markets also 
are sticky (on account of various policies soon to be described), some 
French workers might decline to search for a new job for housing-related 
reasons.  For example, a worker residing in a housing project where rents 
are heavily subsidized might be deterred from investigating alternative 
jobs situated beyond feasible commuting distance from his or her current 
home.  
Moreover, partly as a result of tax policies, the distribution of 
French incomes is far more compressed than the U.S. distribution.  Be-
cause one reason to move is to assume a higher-paying job, this relative 
compression may hinder residential mobility in France.36  
IV. LEGAL POLICIES THAT AFFECT RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 
The standard economic model of a moving decision envisages that a 
household moves when its gains from the move exceed its transaction 
costs of carrying out the move.37  Transaction costs should be expansively 
defined in this context to include the mover’s net psychological and so-
cial costs of relocating.38  Empirical studies indicate that an increase in 
the transaction costs of moving indeed dampens mobility.39 
This Part highlights several French legal policies that deter, respec-
tively, homeowners and renters from moving.40  In 2001, fifty-six percent 
 
household with a member who changed jobs was 2.4 times more likely to have moved to another resi-
dence than a household without such a member). 
 34. JASON SCHACHTER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P23-204, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: 
WHY PEOPLE MOVE 2 (2001). 
 35. But cf. infra note 115 and accompanying text (noting a higher percentage of employment-
related moves in France than in the United States). 
 36. See Giuseppe Bertola & Andrea Ichino, Wage Inequality and Unemployment: United States 
vs. Europe, 10 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANN. 13, 26–31 (1995). 
 37. John M. Quigley, Interest Rate Variations, Mortgage Prepayments and Household Mobility, 
69 REV. ECON. & STAT. 636, 637 (1987); Steven F. Venti & David A. Wise, Moving and Housing Ex-
penditure: Transaction Costs and Disequilibrium, 23 J. PUB. ECON. 207, 213 (1984). 
 38. See infra text accompanying notes 137–40. 
 39. Jos Van Ommeren & Michiel Van Leuvensteijn, New Evidence of the Effect of Transaction 
Costs on Residential Mobility, 45 J. REGIONAL SCI. 681 (2005). 
 40. Although the legal differences between the two nations discussed in the text are among the 
most significant, dozens of others conceivably are pertinent.  For example, the relative difficulty of 
securing mortgage financing in France, mentioned infra note 41, impedes homeowner moves in that 
country.  Of less plausible influence are disparities between French and U.S. policies regarding slum-
clearance.  A government intervention of this nature compels households to move.  France, especially 
in and after the era of Napoleon III and Baron Haussmann, did systematically strive to rid central  
Paris of concentrations of poverty.  See Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Do the Poor Live in Cities? The 
Role of Public Transportation, 63 J. URB. ECON. 1, 22–23 (2008).  By the end of the 1970s, French offi-
cials had largely accomplished this objective and also had razed most of the nation’s suburban shanty-
towns (bidonvilles).  In the United States, bulldozer-style urban renewal similarly has fallen from fash-
ion.  OFF. OF POL’Y & RES. & U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, H150/07, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE 
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of French households were owner-occupants, compared to sixty-eight 
percent of U.S. households.41  Because, as mentioned, homeowners move 
far less often than renters do, this disparity makes the much lower overall 
rate of residential mobility in France even more striking.  
A. Legal Policies that Dampen Moves into and out of  
Owner-Occupied Housing 
1. Policies that Affect the Ease of the Purchase and Sale of a Dwelling 
A variety of legal policies potentially affect the out-of-pocket trans-
action costs of transferring ownership of a dwelling.  According to one 
source, the monetary costs of effectuating the sale of a house in France 
are about seventeen percent of the sale price.42  In the United States, the 
comparable percentage is roughly ten percent.43  In 2010, the central 
source of the difference was the imposition on most dwelling sales, by 
various levels of French government, of aggregate transfer taxes equal to 
5.09 percent of sale price.44  Many U.S. states and localities also impose 
real estate transfer taxes and fees, but their total burden is far lower, av-
 
UNITED STATES: 2007, at tbl.2-11 (2008) [hereinafter AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY] (reporting that 
less than one percent of movers identified “government displacement” as a cause of their move). 
 41. Anne Laferrère & David Le Blanc, Housing Policy: Low-Income Households in France, in A 
COMPANION TO URBAN ECONOMICS 159, 161 (Richard J. Arnott & Daniel P. McMillen eds., 2006).  
One source of this difference is the relative difficulty that a French homebuyer has in obtaining mort-
gage financing.  See id. at 160; see also Maria Concetta Chiuri & Tullio Jappelli, Financial Market Im-
perfections and Home Ownership: A Comparative Study, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 857, 872 (2003); Richard 
K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical and International Context, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Fall 2005, at 93, 93–94. 
 42. See Van Ommeren & Van Leuvensteijn, supra note 39, at 683 fig.1; see also Michèle Belot & 
Sjef Ederveen, Cultural Barriers in Migration Between OECD Countries, J. POPULATION ECON. (Feb. 
12, 2011), http://www.springerlink.com/content/g4333l7651324266/fulltext.pdf (reporting house trans-
fer costs of fifteen percent in France and nine percent in the United States); Jean Bosvieux, Les obsta-
cles a la mobilité des proprietaries [Obstacles to the Mobility of Property Owners], HABITAT 
ACTUALITÉ [HABITAT NEWS], Dec. 2008, at 1, 17–18 (estimating costs at roughly thirteen percent for 
France and seven percent for the United States). 
 43. The figure of ten percent is derived from data provided in a study of 212 home transfers in-
volving FHA-insured loans.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & 
RESEARCH, CLOSING COSTS (2000) [hereinafter CLOSING COSTS], http://www.huduser.org/periodicals 
/ushmc/spring2000/summary-2.html.  The figure excludes the cost of the FHA mortgage insurance 
premium itself, a sort of charge that most homebuyers do not have to pay.  The U.S. estimate, and pre-
sumably the French one, also excludes the value of the time the seller spends to prepare and show the 
house, and that the buyer devotes to the search.  See Donald R. Haurin & H. Leroy Gill, The Impact 
of Transaction Costs and the Expected Length of Stay on Homeownership, 51 J. URB. ECON. 563, 564–
65 (2002).  
 44. See CONSEILS DES NOTAIRES, BUYING OR SELLING A HOME 19 (4th ed. 2008), available at 
http://www.notaires.fr/notaires/en/media/document/905/250.  French governments lowered the rates of 
these droits de mutation between 1996 and 2000.  Writing in 1991, Strassmann reported that house 
transfer taxes in France then were between nine and eleven percent.  Strassmann, supra note 5, at 763.  
Many other European nations also impose significant taxes on real estate transfers.  It has been assert-
ed that these sorts of taxes “unambiguously create lock-in effects that reduce welfare.”  Per Lundborg 
& Per Skedinger, Transaction Taxes in a Search Model of the Housing Market, 45 J. URB. ECON. 385, 
385 (1999). 
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eraging about 0.5 percent.45  The French tax code, moreover, is less for-
giving than the U.S. tax code with regard to the taxation of capital gains 
on owner-occupied housing, and in some instances the French value-
added tax applies to the sale of a new or improved dwelling.46 
In both nations, the parties involved in a house sale typically em-
ploy the services of a variety of intermediaries.  These include real estate 
brokers, mortgage brokers and lenders, and experts in the preparation of 
transfer documents (notaires in France; attorneys or escrow companies in 
the United States).  In both nations, many of these intermediaries are 
somewhat cartelized, partly on account of state-enforced entry re-
strictions and price controls.47  The French notarial system is notably un-
competitive.48  French law compels the use of a notary when real estate is 
transferred and specifies the magnitude of basic notarial fees.49  The ex-
istence of these statutory provisions implies that French notaries have 
substantial lobbying power and exercise it in a manner that tends to 
boost the transaction costs of house sales.50  
 
 45. See CLOSING COSTS, supra note 43 (reporting that, in the sample studied, “government re-
cording and transfer charges” averaged 0.5 percent of the sales price); see also Bosvieux, supra note 42, 
at 17–18 (reporting “taxes” of 0.3 percent in the United States). 
 46. CONSEILS DES NOTAIRES, supra note 44, at 11, 19–21.  When the value-added tax applies, 
however, no transfer tax is due.  Id. at 19.   
 47. See Bruce M. Owen, Kickbacks, Specialization, Price Fixing, and Efficiency in Residential 
Real Estate Markets, 29 STAN. L. REV. 931 (1977) (outlining anticompetitive forces in residential real 
estate conveyancing); Roger Van den Bergh & Yves Montangie, Competition in Professional Services 
Markets: Are Latin Notaries Different?, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 189 (2006) (discussing anticom-
petitive regulation and barriers to entry in the Latin notary profession); John C. Weicher, Comment, 
Policy First, Research Afterward—The History of RESPA, 23 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 297, 298 
(2001) (noting cartelization of title insurance companies). 
 48. See generally EZRA N. SULEIMAN, PRIVATE POWER AND CENTRALIZATION IN FRANCE: THE 
NOTARIES AND THE STATE (1987) (offering an uncomplimentary assessment of the system). 
 49. On the required use of a notary, see Laferrère & Le Blanc, supra note 41, at 160.  Notarial 
fees are fixed according to Décret 78-262 du 8 mars 1978 portant fixation du tariff des notaires [Decree 
No. 78-262 of Mar. 8, 1978 on the fixation of notary charges], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE FR.], Mar. 10, 1978, p. 995 (Fr.).  When a medium-priced 
house is transferred, the notaire’s fee is roughly one percent of the sale price.  
 50. Some commentators assert, however, that notarial systems are relatively efficient in practice.  
See Benito Arruñada, Market and Institutional Determinants in the Regulation of Conveyancers, 23 
EUR. J.L. & ECON. 93, 103 tbl.1 (2007) (providing comparative data on transfer costs); Van den Bergh 
& Montangie, supra note 47, at 210 (rendering an appraisal commissioned by the notarial federations 
of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands).  According to a 2006 World Bank assessment of the cost 
and time involved in registering a land transfer in 175 nations, France ranked poorly (160th) and the 
United States well (10th).  WORLD BANK & INT’L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS 2007: HOW TO 
REFORM 112, 150 (2006); see also Mohammad Amin & Jamal Ibrahim Haidar, The Cost of Registering 
Property: Does Legal Origin Matter?, EMPIRICAL ECON. (May 26, 2011), http://www.springerlink.com/ 
content/h3574k132u324470/fulltext.pdf (drawing on the same World Bank dataset and finding that 
costs of registering property are higher in civil-law countries than in common-law countries).  But see 
Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Anne-Julie Kerhuel, Is Law an Economic Contest? French Reactions 
to the Doing Business World Bank Reports and Economic Analysis of the Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 811, 
817 (2009) (supporting French notaries’ assertions that the compilers of the World Bank data failed to 
understand the French process of land transfer).  
ELLICKSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2012  8:29 AM 
384 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2012 
2. Land-Use Regulation 
In both France and the United States, a household’s desire to 
change the attributes of either its dwelling or its neighborhood motivates 
a solid majority of moves.51  As a result, the more ample and varied a na-
tion’s stock of housing, the more frequently its populace can be expected 
to move.  One of the major determinants of the quantity and diversity of 
a nation’s housing stock is its system of land-use regulation.  Here France 
and the United States take quite different approaches.  The French na-
tional government imposes many mandates on the land-use policies of its 
localities, while the United States gives its states and municipalities a rel-
atively free hand.  In France, municipalities (communes) and semipublic 
agencies commonly have sponsored the largest development projects (in 
the capacity of un maître d’ouvrage).52  In the United States, by contrast, 
even the most ambitious housing developments are typically initiated by 
private entrepreneurs.53  In both nations, land-use regulations vary signif-
icantly from place to place.  In the United States, for example, legal re-
strictions on housing production tend to be far more severe in states and 
localities in the northeast and the far west than elsewhere.54  
The French land-use regulatory system restricts the variety of avail-
able dwellings and neighborhoods more than the U.S. system does.  Most 
French cities and suburbs have a New Urbanist look that many commen-
tators find attractive.  Even the fringes of urbanized areas are relatively 
dense, and these fringes are separated by sharply delineated boundaries 
from surrounding agricultural lands.  Large residential lots, common in 
many U.S. suburbs, are relatively rare in France.  The graph in Figure 1 
suggests these differences in the characteristic urban form of the two na-
tions.  
 
 51. See infra text accompanying notes 117–19, 122–23. 
 52. The complexity of the French system of land-use regulation makes it opaque to outside ob-
servers.  According to a leading expert, the current system mostly dates from the 1950s, and France 
has recently begun to decentralize it, conferring somewhat more regulatory power on communes and 
regional governments.  Interview by Robert C. Ellickson with Jean-Bernard Auby, Professor of Pub. 
Law at Sciences-Po (Nov. 18, 2008).  Professor Auby’s coauthored treatise on the subject is JEAN-
BERNARD AUBY ET AL., DROIT DE L’URBANISME ET DE LA CONSTRUCTION [LAW OF URBAN 
PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION] (8th ed. 2008); see also VINCENT BÉNARD, LE LOGEMENT: CRISE 
PUBLIQUE, REMÈDES PRIVÉS [HOUSING: PUBLIC CRISIS, PRIVATE REMEDIES] 103–20 (2007) (describ-
ing French land-use controls and asserting that they have driven up housing prices); CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, 
supra note 8, at 91–114 (summarizing the regulatory system). 
 53. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 983, 989–95 (2010) (chronicling the falloff in new public housing projects, traditionally 
a major form of government development activity in the United States). 
 54. See Joseph Gyourko et al., A New Measure of the Local Regulatory Environment for Housing 
Markets: The Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index, 45 URB. STUD. 693, 711 tbl.11 (2008) 
(offering an index of the restrictiveness of each state); see also Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Is Man-
hattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in Housing Prices, 48 J.L. & ECON. 331, 367 (2005); John 
M. Quigley & Steven Raphael, Regulation and the High Cost of Housing in California, 95 AM. ECON. 
REV. 323, 327 (2005). 
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FIGURE 1:  
ILLUSTRATIVE DENSITY GRADIENTS MEASURED  
FROM THE CENTER OF CITY OR VILLAGE 
 
In the United States, urban sprawl, whatever its vices, encourages 
residential mobility by giving households a wide choice of dwellings, lot 
sizes, and neighborhood grains.  French land-use law, by contrast, limits 
choices along these dimensions, thus dampening moves by households 
dissatisfied with their present homes and environs.55  
 
B. Legal Sources of Stickiness in Rental Housing Markets 
 
France, like many of the more prosperous European nations, has 
adopted several policies that significantly deter moves by residential ten-
ants.  The impact of these policies is enhanced because there are propor-
tionally more renters in France than in the United States, and because 
renters tend to move far more often than homeowners.   
1. Landlord-Tenant Law 
In the United States, landlord-tenant law is almost exclusively the 
province of state governments, an approach that gives rise to a regulatory 
competition that advocates of decentralization regard as beneficial.  
France, true to its longstanding tradition of centralized control, has a 
largely national system of landlord-tenant law. 
  
 
 55. A dyed-in-the-wool New Urbanist might contend, of course, that the quality of French 
neighborhoods is so uniformly high that dissatisfaction with a neighborhood rarely prompts a house-
hold to move.    
Density 
0 
Miles from Center of City or Village 
France 
United States 
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a. Limits on Landlord Evictions and Lease Terminations 
French law imposes more limits than a typical U.S. state does on a 
landlord’s power to evict a tenant or terminate a lease.56  In 1948, the 
French legislature decreed that certain residential tenants had a “right to 
remain in the premises” (le droit au maintien dans les lieux).57  Subse-
quent legislatures have refined the application of this principle.58  The 
key governing statute, the Law Mermaz-Malandain enacted in 1989, re-
quires an individual landlord to offer an incoming tenant a lease with a 
minimum term of three years.59  For a corporate or other institutional 
landlord (une personne morale), the minimum term is six years.60  A ten-
ant holding one of these leases can terminate it at any time by giving 
three months notice.61  A landlord, however, is held to the full term.  
More important, at the end of the term the landlord must offer the ten-
ant a renewal of a lease, except in special circumstances, such as when 
the landlord wishes personally to reside in the dwelling.62  Because of 
 
 56. In contrast to current French law, the Code Napolèon gave landlords and residential tenants 
a large degree of freedom of contract.  See Anne de Moor, Note, Landlord and Tenant in French Law: 
A Recent Statute, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 425, 428 (1983).  
 57. Loi No. 48-1360 du 1 septembre 1948 portant modification et codification de la législation 
relative aux rapports des bailleurs et locataires ou occupant de locaux d’habitation ou à usage 
professionnel et instituant des allocations de logement [Law of Sept. 1, 1948 for the modification and 
codification of legislation concerning the relationship between landlords and occupants of apart-
ments], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE FR.], Sept. 2, 
1948, p. 8659 (Fr.).  See also Maud Loiseau & Catherine Bonvalet, The Impact of the 1948 Housing 
Law on Residential Trajectories in the Paris Region, 60 POPULATION 301, 302 (Catriona Dutreuilh 
trans., English ed. 2005).  For dramatically different assessments of the merits of this principle, com-
pare Andrea B. Carroll, The International Trend Toward Requiring Good Cause for Tenant Eviction: 
Dangerous Portents for the United States?, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 427 (2008) (criticizing this doc-
trine), with Florence Wagman Roisman, The Right to Remain: Common Law Protections for Security 
of Tenure, 86 N.C. L. REV. 817 (2008) (urging U.S. litigators to push for judicial recognition of a ten-
ant’s right to remain). 
 58. See generally CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, supra note 8 (presenting an overview of housing law in 
France).  English language sources on the details of French landlord-tenant law include Jane Ball, 
Renting Homes: Status and Security in the UK and France, 67 CONVEYANCER & PROP. LAW. 38, 45–58 
(2003); Natalie Boccadoro & Anthony Chamboredon, France (March 29, 2004) (unpublished manu-
script), http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Law/ResearchTeaching/ResearchThemes/ 
EuropeanPrivateLaw/TenancyLawProject/TenancyLawFrance.pdf. 
 59. Loi No. 89-462 du 6 juillet 1989 tendant à améliorer les rapports locatifs et portant modifica-
tion de la loi no. 86-1920 du 23 décembre 1986, art. 10 [Law No. 89-462 of July 6, 1989 to amend and 
modify Law No. 86-1920 of Dec. 23, 1986], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE  FR.], July 8, 1989, p. 8541 (Fr.) [hereinafter Law Mermaz-Malandain of 1989].  
This law exempts from its coverage several significant types of tenancies, including furnished rentals.  
On the twists and turns of French landlord-tenant statutory law during the 1980s, see BÉNARD, supra 
note 52, at 69–72; Nathan H. Schwartz, French Housing Policies in the Eighties: Complexity, Continui-
ty, and Ideology, in THE FRENCH WELFARE STATE: SURVIVING SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE 
187, 201–22 (John S. Ambler ed., 1991).  
 60. Law Mermaz-Malandain of 1989, supra note 59, art. 10. 
 61. Id. at arts. 12, 15. 
 62. Id. at art. 15.  In several respects, French landlord-tenant law is more disadvantageous to an 
institutional landlord than to an individual landlord.  As noted, an individual landlord can offer a 
shorter lease at the outset, and also decline to renew a lease in order to personally reoccupy the dwell-
ing.  This legal tilt in favor of individual landlords has likely contributed to the relative popularity in 
France of condominium ownership of multiunit residential buildings.  Condominiums units comprise 
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these statutory provisions, a French landlord has far less power than a 
U.S. one to trigger a tenant move.  Most U.S. states, by contrast, are far 
more supportive of freedom of contract.  They typically permit a land-
lord and tenant to come to agreement on, for example, a month-to-
month tenancy, a lease with a fixed term of almost any length, and a 
lease that denies the tenant an entitlement to renew.63  
To further honor the principle of a right to remain, French law 
makes it difficult for a residential landlord to evict a tenant, even one in 
breach on account of nonpayment of rent.64  With rare exception, evic-
tions are prohibited between November 1 and March 15—the “winter 
truce” (la trève hivernale)—and for an even longer period in Paris.65  Var-
ious mandatory waiting periods help stretch out even an uncontested 
eviction beyond six months.66  A tenant can further delay ouster by pur-
suing multiple avenues of appeal.  A spokesperson for French landlords 
has asserted that, in practice, an eviction for nonpayment of rent takes 
two or three years to complete.67  Many tenants whose defenses fail in 
court in fact are never evicted, because local officials instead decide to 
exercise their legal option of rendering compensation to the landlord.68  
Most U.S. states are far less protective of a tenant in breach.  Evictions 
typically take place year round, except perhaps during the end-of-the-
year holidays or when the weather is unusually cold or wet.69  In the 
 
twenty-six percent of the total French housing stock, as opposed to seven percent of the U.S. stock.  
(The latter figure includes units in cooperatives as well.)  Moreover, renters occupy about forty-six 
percent of occupied condominium units in France, as compared to thirty-three percent of U.S. condo-
minium units.  L’AGENCE NATIONALE POUR L’INFORMATION SUR LE LOGEMENT [NAT’L HOUSING 
INFO. AGENCY], HABITAT ACTUALITE [HABITAT NEWS] 6–8 (Report No. 89, 2004); see also 
AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 40, at tbls.1A-1, 3-1, 4-1.  In the Paris region, 
noninstitutionally owned condominium units constituted about two-thirds of the private rental stock in 
1998.  Madhu Satsangi, Private Rented Housing in France, 13 NETH. J. HOUSING & BUILT ENV’T 301, 
311 (1998).  When individuals who own condominium units in a multiunit building rent them out, the 
complexity of the structure of property rights makes governance of the building far more difficult than 
it would be if there was a single owner.  See Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Hous-
ing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 33–36 (1991).  
 63. There are exceptions.  In New Jersey, for example, a landlord must show “good cause” when 
refusing to renew a residential lease.  N.J. STAT ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 2011).  The City of Palo Al-
to, California, requires a residential landlord to offer a new or renewing tenant a lease with a mini-
mum term of one year.  Roble Vista Assocs. v. Bacon, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).  
 64. On the eviction process in France, see CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, supra note 8, at 146–60.  In ninety-
eight percent of eviction cases, the landlord is complaining of nonpayment of rent.  Id. at 150. 
 65. Boccadoro & Chamboredon, supra note 58, at 18.  
 66. See Étienne Wasmer, Analyse économique du marché de logement locatif [An Economic 
Analysis of the Rental Apartment Market], 58 REVUE ÉCONOMIQUE [ECON. REV.] 1247, 1251 (2007). 
 67. Marc Vignaud, Interview—Expulsion plus rapide des locataires: “une mesurette” [Quick Evic-
tion of Tenants], LE POINT [POINT] (Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-
societe/interview-expulsion-plus-rapide-des-locataires-une-mesurette/920/0/284525 (last modified Oct. 
21, 2008 7:05 PM).  There are few hard data on the subject.  Compare Boccadoro & Chamboredon, 
supra note 58, at 5 (describing evictions as “almost impossible”), with Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 
118 Q.J. ECON. 453, 497 tbl.v (2003) (estimating that it takes an average of 226 days to complete an 
eviction in France).   
 68. See Ball, supra note 58, at 57. 
 69. Roisman, supra note 57, at 847 n.128; Manny Fernandez, Marshals on Hiatus, Putting Holi-
day Evictions on Hold, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2008, at A27. 
ELLICKSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2012  8:29 AM 
388 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2012 
United States, a landlord typically can complete a residential eviction in 
about two months.70  
b. Rent Controls 
Rent controls have been and are much more prevalent in France 
than in the United States.71  During World War I, France imposed a mor-
atorium on the collection of many residential rents.72  Between 1918 and 
1948, French law pegged residential rents at an ever smaller fraction of 
market price, a policy that stifled the supply of rental dwellings and fos-
tered black markets in apartments.73  In 1948, in an effort to revive the 
private housing sector, the French legislature partially eased rent con-
trols on existing buildings and exempted newly constructed structures al-
together.74  By 2002, the strict rent controls authorized by the 1948 law 
applied to only one percent of French residential tenancies (and to three 
percent of those in Paris).75  
In the United States, there has been less political support for legal 
ceilings on rents.76  Some states and localities did impose rent controls af-
ter the end of World War I, but most of these proved to be short-lived.77  
During World War II, the federal government implemented strict con-
trols nationwide, but then lifted them after the war concluded.78  The 
post-war New York legislature, however, chose to perpetuate the strict 
control of rent levels in existing dwellings in New York City and a few 
other jurisdictions, and later supplemented that system with a milder re-
 
 70. See Djankov et al., supra note 67, at 495 tbl.v (providing an estimate of 49 days); Randy G. 
Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process a Fairer and More Ef-
ficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759, 808–09 (1994) (summarizing studies 
of the durations of evictions in California). 
 71. On the history of French rent controls, see BÉNARD, supra note 52, at 63–79 (offering a 
scathing critique); Satsangi, supra note 62, at 302–03. 
 72. Tyler Stovall, The Consumers’ War: Paris, 1914–1918, 31 FR. HIST. STUD. 293, 305 (2008). 
 73. See BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, FRANCE: NO VACANCIES (1948), reprinted in BERTRAND DE 
JOUVENEL, ECONOMICS AND THE GOOD LIFE: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 157, 158–59 (Dennis 
Hale & Marc Landy eds., 1999); Cicely Watson, Housing Policy and Population Problems in France, 7 
POPULATION STUD. 14, 18–19 (1953).  By 1950, rents in France had fallen to one-tenth of their real 
value in 1913.  Thomas Piketty, Income Inequality in France, 1901–1998, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1004, 1020 
(2003).  In 1949, the average rent burden of a household of four in the Paris region was 1.5 percent of 
the family budget.  ROGER H. DUCLAUD-WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF HOUSING IN BRITAIN AND 
FRANCE 34 (1978).  
 74. SIMONE MORIO, LE CONTRÔLE DES LOYERS EN FRANCE, 1914–1948 [RENT CONTROLS IN 
FRANCE, 1914–1948] (1976).  
 75. See Loiseau & Bonvalet, supra note 57, at 303 tbl.1.  
 76. An overview of the history can be found in W. DENNIS KEATING ET AL., RENT CONTROL: 
REGULATION AND THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET (1998). 
 77. John W. Willis, A Short History of Rent Control Laws, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 54, 69–71, 74–75 
(1950). 
 78. Id. at 79–80; John W. Willis, The Federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 
1118 (1947); see also Jamouneau v. Harner, 109 A.2d 640, 643–44 (N.J. 1955) (referring to termination 
of federal rent controls in 1954). 
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gime known as rent stabilization.79  During the high-inflation years of the 
late 1970s, a few hundred U.S. localities in other states also experimented 
with rent controls, typically of a moderate variety.80  But by 2000, a solid 
majority of U.S. states had enacted statutes forbidding municipal rent 
controls of any sort.81  
In sum, at the outset of the twenty-first century, in both France and 
the United States strict rent controls apply to only a tiny fraction of resi-
dential units.  But there is a major legal difference between the two na-
tions: France, but not the United States, maintains a nationwide system 
of mild rent controls.  The Law Mermaz-Malandain of 1989 limits a land-
lord’s power to increase the rent of a sitting tenant.  A nationwide con-
struction index, which typically understates the rate of increase in market 
rents,82 sets a ceiling on rent increases during the term of the lease.83  
Moreover, when a conventional three-year lease on an unfurnished 
dwelling comes to an end, the statute not only compels the landlord to 
renew in most instances, but also limits any further rent increases to 
those that the national index permits.84  To raise rent by a greater 
amount, a landlord must prove that the former rent “manifestly under-
valued” the premises.85  In practice, a landlord is unlikely to succeed in 
making that showing.  As a result, in ordinary economic times the rents 
of most sitting tenants in France drift further and further below the mar-
ket rent.  This system of rent control nonetheless is mild because the law 
authorizes a significant form of vacancy decontrol.  Once a sitting tenant 
departs, a French landlord is free to raise the rent to the prevailing price 
for comparable units in the same neighborhood.86 
On the whole, France’s landlord-tenant laws dampen its rate of res-
idential mobility.  Many studies have demonstrated that rent ceilings 
have lock-in effects.87  A tenant, who would have left in the absence of 
the controls, remains in place on account of the relatively low rent.88  
 
 79. See Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 326 n.393 (2006) and sources cited therein. 
 80. See Hansmann, supra note 62, at 56 n.67. 
 81. Mitchell Pacelle, Rent-Curb Crusade Plays Last Stop in New York, WALL ST. J., June 13, 
1997, at A2.  According to a tally by the National Multi Housing Council, an association of landlords, 
in 2006 thirty-five states were preempting local rent control ordinances.  See Rent Control Laws by 
State, NAT’L MULTI HOUSING COUNCIL (Feb. 10, 2006), http://www.nmhc.org/Content/ServeContent. 
cfm?ContentItemID=1162.  
 82. See Satsangi, supra note 62, at 317–18. 
 83. Law Mermaz-Malandain of 1989, supra note 59, arts. 16, 17d. 
 84. Id. at art. 17d.  
 85. Id. at art. 17c. 
 86. Id. at art. 17b.  Cf. The Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1954.50–.535 
(West 2011), enacted in 1995, which generally requires a California locality that engages in rent con-
trol to grant a landlord freedom to set the initial rent when leasing a dwelling to a new tenant.  
 87. See, e.g., Richard W. Ault et al., The Effect of Long-Term Rent Control on Tenant Mobility, 
35 J. URB. ECON. 140 (1994); Jakob Roland Munch & Michael Svarer, Rent Control and Tenancy Du-
ration, 52 J. URB. ECON. 542 (2002). 
 88. A tenant may be able to illegally transfer residency rights to another household in return for 
“key money.”  When this is possible, the lock-in effect is mitigated. 
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Moreover, a landlord who anticipates having great difficulty discontinu-
ing a relationship with an undesirable tenant has an incentive to screen 
prospective tenants more carefully and, at the extreme, even to leave a 
dwelling vacant.89  These landlord responses increase the transaction 
costs of rental transactions and aggravate housing shortages, further hin-
dering moves by French households.  
2. Housing Assistance Policies 
Beginning in the first half of the twentieth century, both France and 
the United States established a complex and ever-changing array of 
housing subsidies for tenants of low or moderate income.  For reasons 
presented below, the French system is far more likely than the U.S. sys-
tem to impair tenant mobility.  Indeed, the lock-in effects of French 
housing assistance policies probably far exceed those of French rent con-
trols. 
In any nation, there are two basic forms of housing assistance: pro-
ject-based and tenant-based.90  In both France and the United States, a 
majority of assisted tenants receive project-based aid.  A tenant who ap-
plies for assistance under a project-based program is placed in a queue.  
The person at the top of the queue is offered a specific apartment in a 
subsidized project, typically at a deeply discounted rent.  If the applicant 
were to decline to accept the unit, the applicant’s name typically would 
fall to the bottom of the queue.  If the applicant were to accept and move 
in, however, thereafter the benefits of the subsidy would not be portable.  
Upon vacating the apartment, the tenant would lose the benefits of the 
housing subsidy and the authorities would offer occupancy of the prem-
ises to another household. 
Tenant-based housing aids in both France and the United States 
take the form of housing allowances.91  Housing allowances are less likely 
than project-based assistance to lock tenant households into particular 
dwellings.  A tenant who holds a housing allowance can transport it from 
one rental dwelling to another.  On account of this advantage and others, 
both French and U.S. housing economists generally regard tenant-based 
housing assistance to be superior to project-based assistance.92  
As Table 4 indicates, in France forty percent of tenants live in sub-
sidized housing projects, most of which are known as HLM (habitations à 
loyer modéré).  Dwellings in these projects constitute seventeen percent 
of the total French housing stock, a percentage of “social housing” that is 
 
 89. See BÉNARD, supra note 52, at 75; CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, supra note 8, at 215–18; Wasmer, supra 
note 66.  
 90. See Ellickson, supra note 53, at 985–87. 
 91. See infra text accompanying notes 102–05. 
 92. See, e.g., JOHN C. WEICHER, PRIVATIZING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING 1–2 (1997); Laferrère & Le 
Blanc, supra note 41, at 171–74; Edgar O. Olsen, Housing Programs for Low-Income Households, in 
MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 365, 437 (Robert A. Moffitt ed., 2003). 
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middling for a European nation.93  The most massive clusters of French 
subsidized housing, such as those in les Grands Ensembles, have mostly 
been built in suburban locations.  In the suburbs that surround Paris, six-
ty-three percent of rental apartments are in HLM projects, whereas, 
within the city of Paris itself, the figure is twenty-nine percent.94  Nation-
wide, over one thousand organizations, aided by low-interest government 
loans and tax exemptions, develop and manage HLM projects.  An HLM 
organization typically is either locally or regionally based, and may be ei-
ther a public, private, or public-private entity.95  Mayors and other local 
politicians commonly serve on an HLM organization’s board of directors, 
and civil servants historically have received a disproportionate share of 
the subsidized apartments.96  
 
TABLE 4:  
APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGE OF RESIDENTIAL TENANTS  
RECEIVING RENTAL AID, CIRCA 200197 
 
 France United States 
Reside in a Subsidized Project 40% 13% 
 
Reside in an Unsubsidized 






Reside Rent-Free   4% 
 
  2% 
 










In the major metropolitan areas of France, rent per square meter in 
an HLM project is about half of the rent charged in the private rental 
 
 93. At the turn of the twenty-first century, social rental housing constituted approximately thir-
ty-four percent of the total housing stock in the Netherlands, twenty-two percent in the United King-
dom, seven percent in Germany and Switzerland, and one percent in Spain.  Econ. Comm’n for Eur., 
Guidelines on Social Housing: Principles and Examples, 15 fig.1, U.N. Doc. ECE/HBP/137 (2006), 
http://www.ica.coop/al-housing/attachments/Guidelines%20on%20Social%20Housing%20-%20UNE 
CE.pdf (percentages extrapolated). 
 94. Calculated from data provided in David le Blanc & Anne Laferrère, The Effect of Public 
Social Housing on Households’ Consumption in France, 10 J. HOUSING ECON. 429, 434 tbl.1 (2001). 
 95. On HLM organizations, see BÉNARD, supra note 52, at 35–62 (offering a highly critical ap-
praisal); Jon Pearsall, France, in HOUSING IN EUROPE 9, 15–17, 27–28, 40 (Martin Wynn ed., 1984); 
Schwartz, supra note 59, at 192–93, 214–16.  
 96. Schwartz, supra note 59, at 192–93, 214. 
 97. Laferrère & Le Blanc, supra note 41, at 161, 166. 
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sector.98  The tenant’s saving typically is far larger than the discount a 
tenant receives on account of France’s mild system of rent control.  Be-
cause French policy makers desire to protect sitting tenants from major 
rent increases, an HLM tenant whose income has increased markedly af-
ter initial admission usually continues to enjoy a rent that is substantially 
lower than the market rent.99  This policy fosters long tenant stays in 
HLM projects, particularly those located in better neighborhoods.100  
As Table 4 reveals, forty percent of tenants in France reside in a 
subsidized project, about three times the comparable percentage in the 
United States.  Not only are there relatively fewer tenants in projects in 
the United States, but applicable rent-setting policies also are less likely 
to freeze them into place.  In many such projects, unlike HLM projects, a 
tenant whose income has risen is eventually charged a substantially high-
er rent, a policy that tends to prompt more frequent tenant exits.101  
Beginning in the 1970s, both nations inaugurated major new forms 
of tenant-based assistance.102  Table 4 indicates that about six percent of 
tenant households in the United States currently benefit from housing 
allowances, popularly known as Section 8.  France has had a variety of 
significant housing allowance programs, referred to as l’aide à la 
personne as opposed to l’aide à la pierre.103  These, unlike Section 8, are 
made available to all applicants as an entitlement and are broadly dis-
tributed.104  Of the French tenants who do not reside in an HLM or other 
assisted project, about forty percent receive a housing allowance.105 
Much evidence indicates that tenants are reluctant to move out of a 
dwelling that is either rent controlled or tied to a project-based subsidy.106  
 
 98. See Loiseau & Bonvalet, supra note 57, at 304 fig.1. 
 99. Laferrère & Le Blanc, supra note 41, at 162–63.  
 100. Id. at 167, 171; see also BÉNARD, supra note 52, at 41–42; CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, supra note 8, at 
74–75. 
 101. A U.S. tenant in a public housing project or a project-based Section 8 project has traditional-
ly had to pay thirty percent of income toward rent.  42 U.S.C. §§ 1437a, 1437f (2006) (providing for 
some exceptions).  A prospering tenant in a U.S. housing project subsidized through tax credits, by 
contrast, never runs the risk of being charged a higher rent.  See Shilesh Muralidhara, Deficiencies of 
the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit in Targeting the Lowest-Income Households and in Promoting 
Concentrated Poverty and Segregation, 24 LAW & INEQ. 353, 359 (2006). 
 102. See Ellickson, supra note 53, at 990–92 (discussing the advent of Section 8); Anne Laferrère 
& David Le Blanc, How Do Housing Allowances Affect Rents? An Empirical Analysis of the French 
Case, 13 J. HOUSING ECON. 36, 37 (2004). 
 103. See CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, supra note 8, at 161–63; see generally Laferrère & Le Blanc, supra note 
102 (describing the system). 
 104. See Laferrère & Le Blanc, supra note 41, at 163.  Nearly one-half of HLM tenants receive 
housing allowances as well.  Id. 
 105. Calculated from figures presented supra in Table 4. 
 106. Thomas de Graaff et al., Homeownership, Social Renting, and Labour Mobility Across Eu-
rope, in HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE LABOUR MARKET IN EUROPE, supra note 32, at 53, 61 tbl.3.2 (re-
porting that renters in French social housing had an annual moving rate of ten percent, compared to a 
rate of twenty-one percent for French private renters); Gobillon, supra note 32, at 87, 96 (asserting 
that HLM tenants are relatively immobile); sources cited supra note 87; see also Thierry Debrand & 
Claude Taffin, Les facteurs structurels et conjoncturels de la mobilté résidentielle depuis 20 ans [Struc-
tural and Cyclical Factors of Residential Mobility in the Last Twenty Years], 381–382 ÉCONOMIE ET 
STATISTIQUE [ECON. & STAT.] 125 (2005) (finding that, in 2002, in contrast to 1984, HLM tenants 
ELLICKSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2012  8:29 AM 
No. 2] LEGAL SOURCES OF RESIDENTIAL LOCK-INS 393 
In France, a 1996 survey found that the average length of the current 
rental tenure of tenants benefiting from the strict rent controls imposed 
by the 1948 law was twenty years; of tenants in HLM projects, ten years; 
and of tenants in the private rental sector, 5.6 years.107  A nation’s hous-
ing policies can dramatically influence tenant mobility.  
V. IS A HIGHER RATE OF RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY DESIRABLE? 
Is a nation’s rate of residential mobility an important social indica-
tor, one perhaps as weighty as its unemployment rate, crime rate, or lit-
eracy rate?  Politicians rarely campaign on mobility issues, a clue that 
they sense few voters care about the topic.  In this Part, I nonetheless ar-
gue that issues of residential mobility warrant more attention than they 
have traditionally received.  This assertion must be tentative, however, 
both because analysts are only beginning to develop a persuasive frame-
work for assessing the normative implications of mobility, and because 
pertinent empirical studies are in short supply.108  
For simplicity, the normative evaluation of household relocations 
presented in this Part excludes from consideration several unquestiona-
bly pertinent and important values, such as freedom, self-actualization, 
and distributive justice.109  The discussion instead is limited to utilitarian 
assessment of the costs and benefits of residential moves.  These include 
psychological impacts and social consequences, such as the effects of 
moves on stocks of social capital.  As mentioned, the standard economic 
model of a relocation decision assumes that a household moves when its 
members’ expected gains from the move exceed the costs they expect to 
bear in accomplishing the move.110  This Part investigates these costs and 
benefits, and also the externalities that might stem from a household’s 
decision to move.  A household move is deemed to be socially desirable 
only when the net gains reaped by those who move exceed any net nega-
tive externalities that the move would cause.111  Although this straight-
forward utilitarian perspective omits pertinent values, it has the merit of 
 
were less mobile than private-sector French tenants); Gordon Hughes & Barry McCormick, Do Coun-
cil Housing Policies Reduce Migration Between Regions?, 91 ECON. J. 919 (1981) (concluding that sub-
sidized projects in Britain tend to lock-in tenants).  
 107. Loiseau & Bonvalet, supra note 57, at 305.  
 108. An early collection of essays is 19 URBAN AFFAIRS ANNUAL REVIEWS, RESIDENTIAL 
MOBILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (W.A.V. Clark & Eric G. Moore eds., 1980).  
 109. If it is normatively essential for a person or household to be able to make a fresh start, the 
freedom to relocate would appear to be a core civil liberty.  On the potential relevance of distributive 
justice, see infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra text accompanying note 37.  This conventional economic model, which supposes 
that individuals are both rational actors and utilitarians, is used here on account of its spareness.  An 
enriched model might explicitly take into account, for example, psychological complications such as 
loss aversion and limitations on cognitive capacities.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 1–10 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).  
 111. See also Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 890, 935 (2011) (assessing mobility issues in cost-benefit terms).  A move may generate posi-
tive externalities that outweigh its negative externalities.  See infra text accompanying notes 162–63. 
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establishing a benchmark for those who might aspire to apply a richer 
normative framework.  
A. A Household’s Direct Benefits from Moving  
In the 1990s, officials in both the United States and France began to 
ask movers why they relocated.112  The responses reveal many possible 
advantages.113  Because the respondents in the two nations were asked 
somewhat different questions, the comparisons between the U.S. and 
French contexts presented below are no better than suggestive.  
1. Taking on a New Job 
In the United States, sixteen percent of movers state that they had 
moved primarily for an employment-related reason, such as to change 
jobs or reduce commuting burdens.114  The comparable figure in France is 
twenty-six percent.115  In both nations, the longer the distance of a move, 
the more likely the move is work related.116  
2. Reconfiguring Household Arrangements: Housemates, Dwelling 
Attributes, and Ownership Structure 
In both nations, however, a majority of moves—and indeed three-
fourths of short-distance moves—are primarily provoked not by work (or 
neighborhood) considerations, but rather by household and housing con-
siderations.117  
Because U.S. movers are asked more precise questions, more is 
known about their motivations.  Roughly one-fourth of U.S. movers re-
locate for “family related reasons,” for example, to cohabit with a new 
housemate, or terminate a former cohabitation arrangement.118  Young 
 
 112. The statistics for the United States provided in this subpart primarily pertain to 1999–2000 
and are mostly drawn from SCHACHTER, supra note 34, at 4 tbl.2.  Schachter’s study is largely based on 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey of March 2000.  The statistics for France are 
drawn from a table in Gobillon, supra note 32, at 84.  Gobillon compiled his numbers from the Euro-
pean Community Household Panel (1994–1996). 
 113. The classic investigation is PETER H. ROSSI, WHY FAMILIES MOVE: A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF URBAN RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY (1955). 
 114. See SCHACHTER, supra note 34, at 4 tbl.2 (providing data from the late 1990’s). 
 115. Calculated from figures provided in Gobillon, supra note 32, at 84.  Because the French per-
centage is almost double the U.S. percentage, it appears that housing lock-ins may not be a major 
cause of job immobility in France.  
 116. Of U.S. moves across a county line, thirty-one percent are work related, compared to six per-
cent of moves that do not cross a county line.  See SCHACHTER, supra note 34, at 4 tbl.2.  In France, 
sixty-two percent of interdepartment movers report that their move is work related, compared to 
twenty percent of intradepartment movers.  Calculated from figures provided in Gobillon, supra note 
32, at 84. 
 117. In France, seventy-six percent of intracommunal movers identify this motivation.  Calculated 
from figures provided in Gobillon, supra note 32, at 84. 
 118. See SCHACHTER, supra note 34, at 4 tbl.2.  In this instance, the U.S. Census Bureau arguably 
should have asked respondents to identify “household-composition reasons,” a category in some ways 
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adults tend to move more often than others partly because they are in a 
volatile stage of the human life cycle.  A twenty- or thirty-something, for 
example, may decide to leave the parental home, to cohabit with a signif-
icant other, or to move to a home large enough to accommodate newly 
arrived children.  Conversely, empty nesters may move locally in re-
sponse to the departure of their adult children.119  
Another one-fourth of U.S. moves are sparked by the collective de-
sire of a stable group of cohabitants to shift to a dwelling with more suit-
able physical attributes.120  A prospering middle-aged couple with grow-
ing children, for example, might be on the lookout for a larger house 
with a bigger backyard.  Satisfying this wish does not necessarily require 
a change of neighborhood. 
Household members also care about their form of tenure.  A deci-
sion to switch from renting to owning primarily motivates about one-
eighth of U.S. moves.121  Occupant-ownership enhances an occupant’s se-
curity of possession and, by eliminating the landlord, greatly reduces the 
transaction costs of household governance.122  Some movers, conversely, 
seek to switch from the simplicity of standard, fee-simple homeowner-
ship to the complexity of structured life in a common-interest communi-
ty. 
3. Opting for a New Neighborhood 
A household may move to a nearly identical dwelling in the same 
municipality simply to bring about a change in local surroundings.  A 
new neighborhood might offer, for example, safer streets, a better ele-
mentary school, or more shops within walking distance.  Conversely, an 
individual whose income has fallen might move to a neighborhood that is 
less appealing in these sorts of respects in order to reduce housing costs 
and property-tax bills.  In the United States, a preference for neighbor-
hood change appears to motivate less than ten percent of moves.123 
  
 
broader than “family-related reasons.”  See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL 
ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH 1–9 (2008). 
 119. These sorts of moves would not be necessary if the owner of a dwelling could readily alter 
the dwelling’s physical attributes.  This, of course, is seldom feasible. 
 120. SCHACHTER, supra note 34, at 4 tbl.2. 
 121. Id. 
 122. The relative advantages of owning and renting a home are discussed in ELLICKSON, supra 
note 118, at 86–91. 
 123. See SCHACHTER, supra note 34, at 4 tbl.2; see also Barrett A. Lee et al., Neighborhood Con-
text and Residential Mobility, 31 DEMOGRAPHY 249 (1994) (finding that neighborhood attributes typi-
cally play only a minor role in a mover’s decision). 
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4. Moving to Reside Nearer to Intimates 
In the United States, eight percent of movers indicate that their 
primary reason for having moved was “other family/personal related,” a 
category that includes a relocation motivated to live closer to, but not 
with, family members or friends.124  This percentage is low in part because 
most people already reside near their intimates, an indication of the in-
tensity of preferences for this sort of proximity.125  In France, fifty-one 
percent of adults report that a close relative resides in either the same 
commune (municipality) or a neighboring one.126  In the United States, 
the median distance between the dwelling of a married daughter and the 
dwelling of her mother is twenty miles.127 
5. Voting with One’s Feet for a New Political Environment 
The well-known Tiebout hypothesis supposes that households shop 
among competing municipalities that offer different packages of taxes, 
regulatory policies, and public goods.128  Interstate and international mi-
grants presumably also are alert to how higher-level governmental units 
differ along these dimensions.129  Many commentators regard Tiebout-
style competition to be generally beneficial.130  Moves are likely to result 
in the better pairing of households, given their tastes, with jurisdictions.  
In addition, the risk that disgruntled households may exit helps keep pol-
 
 124. Calculated from data presented in AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 40, at 76–78 
tbl.2-11.  The European Community Household Panel survey did not enable a respondent to pinpoint 
family or friendship considerations as the primary motivations for a move.  See Gobillon, supra note 
32, at 84. 
 125. See Michael S. Dahl & Olav Sorenson, The Social Attachment to Place, 89 SOC. FORCES 633 
(2010) (finding that blue-collar Danes typically are willing to sacrifice financial gains in order to live 
near family and friends); Michael S. Dahl & Olav Sorenson, The Migration of Technical Workers, 67 J. 
URB. ECON. 33 (2010) (reporting a similar finding for Danish scientists and engineers); see also Alber-
to Palloni et al., Social Capital and International Migration: A Test Using Information on Family Net-
works, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1262 (2001) (finding that, when a sibling migrates abroad, it is more likely that 
another sibling will follow).  Family members, of course, do not invariably seek to live near one anoth-
er.  An adult child may move to a remote location, for example, to be distant from an overbearing par-
ent.  
 126. Denise Arbonville & Catherine Bonvalet, Demographic Trends and Urban Change in 
France: Changes in Housing Patterns Since 1950, in FAMILY AND HOUSING: RECENT TRENDS IN 
FRANCE AND SOUTHERN EUROPE 269, 305 (Catherine Bonvalet et al. eds., 2009) (reporting results of 
a 2001 survey). 
 127. Janice Compton & Robert A. Pollak, Proximity and Coresidence of Adult Children and Their 
Parents: Description and Correlates 10 (Univ. Mich. Ret. Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 2009-215, 
2009).  The median distance between the residences of a married son and his mother is twenty-five 
miles.  Id.  
 128. Tiebout, supra note 2, at 418–19; see also THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATS (William A. Fischel ed., 2006).  But see Todd E. Pettys, 
The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. L.J. 481 (2004) (expressing doubts about the merits of Tiebout-style 
competition); David Schleicher, The City As a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507 
(noting that Tiebout competition may impair achievement of agglomeration efficiencies). 
 129. Ilya Somin, Tiebout Goes Global: International Migration As a Tool for Voting with Your 
Feet, 73 MO. L. REV. 1247, 1250–54 (2008). 
 130. See, e.g., id. 
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iticians on their toes.  Legal policies that restrain residential mobility di-
minish both of these beneficial effects.131  
It is notable that neither U.S. nor French data-gatherers have ex-
plicitly asked movers whether they relocated in order to associate them-
selves with a more suitable government.  Perhaps the soundings that the 
officials had when they were designing their survey instruments indicated 
that few movers would volunteer this response.132  In any event, it ap-
pears that, when members of a household “vote with their feet,” political 
considerations rarely dominate their thinking.  
6. Weather 
Less than two percent of long-distance moves in the United States 
are motivated primarily to bring about a change of climate.133  This low 
figure nonetheless is sufficient to generate, over time, steady population 
growth in places with pleasant weather.  By extension, even if only a 
small fraction of households were to move each year for Tieboutian rea-




Laws that limit mobility can prevent members of households from 
bettering their circumstances along all of the dimensions listed.  On ac-
count of these laws, an individual may, for example, turn down a superior 
job, live with unwanted housemates, remain in an unsuitable dwelling, 
put up with an unwanted tenure arrangement, or refrain from moving 
closer to family and friends.  It appears that no attempts have been made 
to estimate the magnitude of these costs of antimobility policies.134  For 
 
 131. In the United States, where local school boards administer primary and secondary education, 
a moving parent may give great weight to the quality of local schools.  This consideration is apt to be 
less important in France, where the National Ministry of Education prescribes a national curriculum 
and employs all public-school teachers.  See Wolfgang Hörner, France, in THE EDUCATION SYSTEMS 
OF EUROPE 263, 267–77 (Wolfgang Hörner et al. eds., 2007).  The net effect of this difference in educa-
tional policy on relative residential mobility in the two nations is ambiguous.  Because school quality is 
more uniform in France, French parents have somewhat less reason than parents in the United States 
to shop with their feet for schools.  On the other hand, because the French curriculum is standardized, 
French parents might anticipate that moves would be less disruptive for their children.  
 132. The American Housing Survey presents movers a long menu of possible reasons for having 
made a move.  It comes closest to probing Tieboutian motivations when it asks whether the primary 
reason for moving to a new “neighborhood” was the presence of “good schools.”  Six percent of mov-
ers respond to this question in the affirmative.  AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 40, at 76–78 
tbl.2-11.  Compare id., with Paul W. Rhode & Koleman S. Strumpf, Assessing the Importance of 
Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1648, 1649 (2003) (assert-
ing that only five percent of movers responding to the American Housing Survey reported that public 
services, including schooling, primarily motivated their moves).  
 133. See SCHACHTER, supra note 34, at 4 tbl.2 (indicating that a “change of climate” motivates 
less than two percent of intercounty moves). 
 134. Most studies of decisions to move strive to untangle the causes of moves, not the magnitude 
of the net benefits that movers attain.  See, e.g., Alden Speare, Jr., Residential Satisfaction As an Inter-
vening Variable in Residential Mobility, 11 DEMOGRAPHY 173 (1974).  But cf. Stephan Grzeskowiak et 
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what it is worth, in France most individuals who have made a local move 
do report a sharply higher level of satisfaction with their new housing.135 
B. A Household’s Direct Costs of Moving 
Although members of a household may reap many sorts of private 
benefits from a move, a residential relocation also entails a variety of 
costs.  In any given year, these are sufficiently large to anchor eighty-six 
percent of U.S. households in place.  Among the assorted costs of mov-
ing, economists traditionally have stressed a mover’s out-of-pocket costs 
and opportunity costs of time spent to arrange a move.136  A mover might 
also anticipate that a shift to a new living environment would give rise to 
net psychological costs (or benefits), and take those into account as 
well.137  According to Stephanie Stern, psychologists have found that 
adult movers in the United States experience some short-term stress, but 
no long-term psychological impairment.138  Children who move frequent-
ly tend to perform less well in school, but mostly on account of the char-
acteristics of their caretakers, not on account of the moves themselves.139  
A few scholars have also begun to explore the social consequences 
of moves, both negative and positive.  The relocation of a household typ-
ically affects numerous social relationships.  When an adult child moves 
to a distant city, for example, the move may lessen the quality of the 
child’s relationship with a parent who formerly lived close by.  A portion 
of these sorts of social costs are directly borne by those who move.  A 
child, upon moving, directly bears the loss of the net personal advantages 
of having lived in proximity to a parent.  Researchers predictably have 
found that the prospect of the deterioration of social ties can deter a 
long-distance move.140 
 
al., Housing Well-Being: Developing and Validating a Measure, 79 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 503 (2006) 
(exploring the sources of “housing well-being” and defining the term broadly to include the purchase, 
preparation, ownership, use, maintenance, and sale of the home). 
 135. See AHN & BLAZQUEZ, supra note 11, at 9; see also EUR. FOUND. FOR THE IMPROVEMENT 
OF LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS, MOBILITY IN EUROPE—THE WAY FORWARD 8 fig.4 (2007) 
[hereinafter LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS] (reporting that Europeans who had recently moved 
a long distance often stated that their move bettered both their housing conditions and local ameni-
ties).  
 136. See Haurin & Gill, supra note 43, at 564–65. 
 137. See Larry A. Sjaastad, The Costs and Returns of Human Migration, 70 J. POL. ECON. 80, 85 
(1962) (discussing migrants’ “psychic costs”).  
 138. Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 1093, 1115 (2009). 
 139. See, e.g., Shana Pribesh & Douglas B. Downey, Why Are Residential and School Moves As-
sociated with Poor School Performance?, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 521 (1999); see also Stern, supra note 138, 
at 1117–18 (reviewing the literature).  But cf. Shigehiro Oishi & Ulrich Schimmack, Residential Mobili-
ty, Well-Being, and Mortality, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 980, 991 (2010) (asserting that 
childhood moves impair the adult well-being of introverted persons). 
 140. See David et al., supra note 5, at 201 (finding that households with large amounts of local 
social capital are less likely to move a long distance); Kamhon Kan, Residential Mobility and Social 
Capital, 61 J. URB. ECON. 436, 437 (2007) (reporting a similar finding); see also Joong-Hwan Oh, Social 
Bonds and the Migration Intentions of Elderly Urban Residents: The Mediating Effect of Residential 
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C. Externalities that Moves May Create  
and Mechanisms for Their Possible Internalization 
Some negative (and positive) social consequences of a move, how-
ever, are externalized to those who have relationships with the individu-
als who relocate.  An adult child who moves away from a parent affects 
the social welfare of the parent.  Those considering a move may not take 
full account of these sorts of externalities.  As a result, a move that serves 
the direct interests of the members of a moving household is not neces-
sarily cost justified from a larger social perspective.141  
1. A Framework for Analyzing the Social Externalities  
Arising out of a Move 
A household relocation can affect social relationships of many dif-
ferent kinds—a variety that the literature on residential mobility has yet 
to adequately sort out.  Borrowing from physics, let us call the most in-
ternally powerful member(s) of a moving household the prime mover(s).  
A prime mover has social ties of varying strengths with several sorts of 
others.  These relationships include:  
(1) strong ties with less powerful members of the prime mover’s own 
household, such as minor children;  
(2) strong ties with intimates (family and close friends) who reside in 
other households, whether nearby or distant; 
(3) weak ties with nonintimates who share a nonlocal social network, 
such as fellow members of a national association or an online 
chat group; and  
(4) weak ties with nonintimates who reside nearby, such as casual 
neighbors, local merchants, and fortuitous coworkers. 
It has become conventional to conceptualize valuable social ties as 
social capital.  According to Robert Putnam’s “lean and mean” defini-
tion, social capital consists of “social networks and the associated norms 
of reciprocity and trustworthiness.”142  Local social capital is fostered by 
proximity, whereas nonlocal social capital is not.143 
 
Satisfaction, 22 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 127, 131 (2003) (asserting that local social ties deter 
moves by the elderly).  
 141. See Sjaastad, supra note 137, at 91–92.  
 142. Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century, 
30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 137 (2007).  Social capital may be valued not only because it leads 
to better economic and social outcomes such as greater prosperity and less crime, but also because it 
can stimulate feelings of self-esteem and solidarity that are valued for their own sake.  See id. at 137–
38. 
 143. The concept of local social capital is developed in David et al., supra note 5, at 191–92, and 
Kan, supra note 140.  
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In both the United States and France, the median distance of a resi-
dential move is short, about six miles.144  A short-distance move is apt to 
affect, for better or worse, only the last of the four types of social ties just 
listed.  When all residents of a household move in tandem, their 
intrahousehold ties are relocated to a new setting, but they remain intact.  
A local move also would be unlikely to have much effect on the quality 
of the movers’ relationships with family members and close friends who 
are members of other households.  Those ties typically are strong enough 
to be little influenced by the addition or subtraction of a few miles of 
commuting distance.  Nor would a local move affect a weak nonlocal tie, 
such as one that developed out of comembership in a national chess fed-
eration.  But a short-distance move likely would rupture ties that are 
both local and weak, for example, casual relationships with immediate 
neighbors.145  The prospect of losing weak local ties of this sort, however, 
is unlikely to deter a local move, because these sorts of social relation-
ships appear to be readily replaceable.  Within less than two years, most 
people who have moved in the United States find that they have estab-
lished satisfactory social ties with their new neighbors.146 
A long-distance residential move, of course, is likely to be far more 
socially consequential than a short-distance move.  When a household 
moves far away from family members and close friends, the resulting 
separation may significantly diminish the strength of, although not en-
tirely rupture, the household members’ bonds with intimates left behind.  
2. Mechanisms for Internalization of Externalities 
Arising out of a Move 
The Coase Theorem suggests, however, that what might at first 
blush appear to be an externality may be internalized through bargaining 
or some other process.147  In fact, a prime mover is likely to at least par-
tially take into account the effects of a long-distance move on the social 
welfare of intimates.  In this context, instead of the cash exchanges that 
feature prominently in the literature on Coasean bargaining, the chief 
mechanisms of internalization are likely to be warmer and subtler: self-
enforced feelings of altruism (inculcated or innate), the gift exchanges 
characteristic of an intimate relationship, and the pressures of diffusely 
enforced social norms. 
Consider, for starters, the effects of a prime mover’s decision on less 
powerful members of the same household.  Parents who are considering 
alternative dwelling places, while unlikely to give their young children 
any formal role in the decision, are apt to be attentive to effects on their 
 
 144. See supra text accompanying notes 14–16. 
 145. See Stern, supra note 138, at 1122–24 (discussing the relative weakness of household mem-
bers’ social ties with most neighbors). 
 146. Id. at 1115–17. 
 147. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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children’s welfare.148  Altruism thus serves to help internalize what would 
otherwise be an externality.  What if one spouse would gain greatly from 
a long-distance move, but the other spouse would be somewhat disad-
vantaged by it?  In a scenario of this sort, the spouse who wished to move 
might consider the magnitude of the reluctant spouse’s disutility out of 
some combination of altruism and the realization that the reluctant 
spouse eventually would be entitled to implicit compensation via the 
couple’s informal process of gift exchange.149  In these ways, the negative 
externalities that would stem from the proposed move might be at least 
partially internalized to the spouse who would be advantaged by it.150 
Less likely to be internalized are the more diffuse social effects of a 
long-distance move on close friends and family members who live in 
households other than the movers.  Yet even here, altruism, implicit gift 
exchange, and norms supporting loyalty to family and friends again may 
at least mitigate the inefficiencies threatened.151  Suppose that a hus-
band’s parents are eager to move from afar in order to be nearer to their 
young grandchildren, but they suspect that their daughter-in-law actually 
would prefer that they not live close by.  In an instance of this sort, the 
grandparents might nevertheless make the move, but thereafter provide 
frequent babysitting services, an implicit quid pro quo for their daughter-
in-law. 
The external effects of a move on the quality of a social tie that is 
both weak and local are those least likely to be internalized.  Because 
there is a lack of intimacy between the movers and those they affect, nei-
ther altruism nor gift exchange is a promising internalization mechanism.  
In some social contexts, the arrival of a stranger may reduce trust and so-
cial solidarity.  In these instances, the diffuse enforcement of social 
norms of chilliness toward strangers may be the only, and an imperfect, 
mechanism for deterring these incursions.152  
 
 148. Cf. Jacob Mincer, Family Migration Decisions, 86 J. POL. ECON. 749 (1978) (asserting that a 
household member would internalize most of a move’s effects on other household members).   
 149. For discussion of the internal social dynamics of households, see ELLICKSON, supra note 118, 
at 92–120.  
 150. Complete internalization is unlikely.  Because of legal and social limits on interspousal con-
tracting, a decision of a married couple to move ultimately may not benefit both spouses.  See Shelly 
Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Efficiency in Marriage, 1 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 153, 163–64 (2003). 
 151. See Douglas S. Massey, Why Does Immigration Occur? A Theoretical Synthesis, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 34, 44 (Charles Hirsch-
man et al. eds., 1999) (discussing social pressures on immigrants exerted by, for example, friends and 
members of extended families). 
 152. Household moving decisions can affect the efficiency of urban form.  Because a moving 
household experiences only the average agglomeration effects, not marginal ones, decentralized mar-
kets do not assure that urban areas will be of optimal size and density.  See George S. Tolley, The Wel-
fare Economics of City Bigness, 1 J. URB. ECON. 324, 327 (1974); see also Schleicher, supra note 128.  
These diffuse externalities also are highly unlikely to be internalized by informal mechanisms. 
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3. Should Household Moves Be Discouraged? 
Several thoughtful commentators regard the net social externalities 
arising from residential moves to be sufficiently negative to warrant con-
sideration of legal constraints on relocation.  Margaret Radin argues that 
rent controls may be justified in some contexts in order to slow gentrifi-
cation and preserve social ties within a close-knit community of ten-
ants.153  Ingrid Ellen and Brendan O’Flaherty cautiously praise policies 
that have contributed to the “stability” of residential arrangements in 
New York City.154  John Powell and Marguerite Spencer favor deterring 
the entry of wealthy households into traditionally poor neighborhoods in 
part to preserve existing social networks.155 
The emerging empirical literature on social capital may eventually 
illuminate the soundness, or unsoundness, of these views.  Some studies 
do suggest that a higher rate of residential turnover, whether of home-
owners or renters, does somewhat diminish a neighborhood’s social capi-
tal.156  Moreover, as Edward Glaeser and his coauthors have shown, a 
person who expects to move soon is likely, all else equal, to devote less 
effort to developing local social capital.157  Transients in a neighborhood, 
for example, seldom become involved in local politics.  The net externali-
ties of a residential move thus can be unquestionably negative.158 
But, from a utilitarian perspective, this possibility is hardly decisive.  
People who voluntarily transplant themselves do so because they antici-
pate reaping a wide variety of advantages.159  These benefits—perhaps a 
new job, a change in housemates, first becoming a homeowner—may be 
life changing.  In addition, proponents of neighborhood stability may ex-
aggerate the negative social consequences of moves.  As noted, intimates 
may be able to employ a variety of informal mechanisms to soften these 
 
 153. Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 368–71 (1986). 
 154. Ellen & O’Flaherty, supra note 26, at 27. 
 155. John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old “One-Two”: Gentrification 
and the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433, 435, 475–76 (2003).  Oppo-
nents of gentrification commonly invoke principles of distributive justice, a value incommensurate 
with utilitarianism. 
 156. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of 
Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 919 (1997) (finding that population turnover weakens informal 
social controls within a neighborhood); Stern, supra note 138, at 1124–25 (citing studies).  A pioneer-
ing exploration is John D. Kasarda & Morris Janowitz, Community Attachment in Mass Society, 39 
AM. SOC. REV. 328 (1974). 
 157. Edward L. Glaeser et al., An Economic Approach to Social Capital, 112 ECON. J. F437, F439, 
F450 (2002) (finding that mobility reduces social capital); see also Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. 
Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECON. 354, 373–
77 (1999) (finding that length of residence in a community is positively associated with various forms 
of civic engagement). 
 158. It has been asserted that the social capital of a community tends to decline as its social heter-
ogeneity increases.  See Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, Participation in Heterogeneous Com-
munities, 115 Q.J. ECON. 847 (2000); Putnam, supra note 142, at 150.  A higher rate of residential mo-
bility probably correlates with greater social heterogeneity. 
 159. See supra text accompanying notes 112–33. 
ELLICKSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2012  8:29 AM 
No. 2] LEGAL SOURCES OF RESIDENTIAL LOCK-INS 403 
consequences.160  Although a move indeed is likely to rupture weak social 
ties among nonintimate neighbors, both those who move and those who 
stay can readily reestablish neighborly relations with those next door.161  
The net social externalities of a move, moreover, may be positive, 
not negative.  A grandparent may move to be near small grandchildren.  
The arrival of newcomers may lessen xenophobia, strengthen bridging 
social ties, and create synergies that augment others’ human capital.162  
For these reasons, some analysts have urged the nations of Europe to 
take affirmative steps to accelerate rates of migration.163   
A high rate of residential mobility, if socially destructive, might be 
expected to correlate positively with a low stock of social capital.  Cir-
cumstantial evidence suggests otherwise.  According to most metrics, 
France, despite its relative residential stability, has a significantly lower 
level of social capital than does the United States.164  The state of New 
York, which includes the “frozen” New York City, has one of the lowest 
levels of social capital of the states outside the south.165  The Scandinavi-
an nations, on average the most residentially mobile in Europe, are 
noted for their towering levels of social capital.166  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The annual rate of residential mobility in France traditionally has 
been about one-half the rate in the United States.  This disparity results 
not only from deep-seated cultural differences, but also from a cluster of 
French legal policies.  Perhaps the most notable of these are the 5.09 per-
cent transfer tax on home sales in France and the subsidized HLM pro-
jects that house forty percent of French tenants.  
The normative implications of differentials in residential mobility 
are open to debate.  The members of a household can obtain a wide vari-
ety of benefits from moving, but the magnitudes of these benefits are 
hard to weigh.  Offsetting those benefits are the potential social costs of 
 
 160. See supra text accompanying notes 147–52. 
 161. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 162. See also Bonin et al., supra note 5, at 52 (emphasizing how geographic mobility can help cure 
imbalances in regional labor markets).  Tieboutian moves that signal political evaluations also can 
generate positive externalities.  
 163. Id. at 51; see generally id. at 50–69 (discussing “optimum mobility”). 
 164. The authors of a multinational study of levels of civic cooperation and trust place France in 
the bottom third, on both dimensions, of the nations they study.  According to their findings, based on 
the World Values Surveys, Germany and Spain rank around the middle, the United States in the top 
two-fifths, and the Scandinavian nations at or near the top.  Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does 
Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251, 1259 
(1997).   
 165. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY 298 (2000); Alesina & La Ferrara, supra note 158, at 848 fig.1. 
 166. See de Graaff, supra note 106, at 61; Molloy et al., supra note 8, at 193; supra notes 5, 164.  
These correlations, of course, do not prove causation, because the influence of other variables is not 
taken into account.  It is possible that if France and New York City had not adopted their antimobility 
policies, their stocks of social capital might have been yet lower. 
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moves, for example, the attenuation of neighborhood social ties.  Com-
mentators inclined to favor neighborhood stability should be aware, 
however, that the net social consequences of a move may actually be pos-
itive, as they might be, for example, when the move would bring inti-
mates closer together or fosters bridging between formerly isolated social 
groups.  
At present, evidence on many of these matters is thin.  It is possible 
that, on account of differences in the values of the residents of the two 
nations, a low rate of residential mobility best suits France, and a high 
rate best suits the United States.  In light of the inadequacy of current 
knowledge, however, in neither nation should policy makers be compla-
cent about laws that influence householders’ moving decisions.167 
 
 167. Some French observers are not content with things as they are.  At workshops where an ear-
ly version of this research was presented, economists Eric Brousseau of Paris-X and Etienne Wasmer 
of Sciences-Po emphatically stated that they regard the rate of residential mobility in France to be un-
desirably low.  See also CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, supra note 8, at 325 (mentioning critics of French policies 
that hinder mobility); LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS, supra note 135, at 17–19 (generally endors-
ing promobility policies).  
